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Abstract
Deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) provide an alternative enforcement tool 
to tackle economic crime. Prosecutors tailor punishment and remediation measures 
more accurately to satisfy the principles of prosecution. The companies in question 
can avoid criminal charges, provided that they comply with agreed terms and con-
ditions. The use of DPAs is conducive to relieving collateral consequences, while 
being able to deter, punish and reshape corporate behaviour. In principle, enforce-
ment authorities can maximise the leverage with criminal liability over companies 
to cultivate a robust corporate culture against bribery. It is argued that an effective 
global anti-bribery regime rests with not only transnational cooperation, but also 
adequate governance and rigorous compliance. With the DPAs having increased 
in prominence as a mainstay of the US enforcement regime, it remains to be seen 
whether the potent tool will be viable and further reshape the future enforcement 
landscape of the anti-bribery regime in the UK and even on a global basis.
Keywords Multinational company (MNC) · Corporate criminal liability · 
Antibribery · Deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) · Global settlement
1 Introduction
Bribery represents a serious impediment to multinational companies (MNCs)’ gov-
ernance integrity and fair competition in the global market.1 An eruption of high-
profile scandals has triggered anti-bribery enforcement agencies to strengthen their 
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policing of corporate behaviour.2 The prevalent bribery of foreign officials has 
prompted legislation,3 which also suggests the need for more effective law enforce-
ment to crack down on the unlawful conduct.4 Considered as the toughest legisla-
tion on bribery in the world, the Bribery Act (BA 2010) helps to sustain increased 
global enforcement of anti-bribery laws. For the sake of saving precious juridical 
resources on the one hand, and attenuating adverse collateral effects arising from 
criminal liability on the other, the UK introduced a framework of deferred prosecu-
tion agreements (DPAs) through the Crime and Courts Act 2013.5 With the DPAs 
being effective from 24 February 2014, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) and the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPPs) have the power to offer and enter into DPAs 
subject to the court’s approval. It represents a critical weapon to resolve allegations 
of corporate crime. As a discretionary tool, a DPA is reached between prosecutors 
and defendants where the latter are accused of bribery. It involves the suspension of 
a criminal indictment for an agreed period, in exchange for the defendant fulfilling 
certain agreed conditions.6 The final approval of a DPA will rest with the court. The 
prosecutor will notify the court that the suspended criminal proceedings should be 
discontinued on the condition that the defendant has satisfied the terms and condi-
tions once a DPA expires.7 Should there be any breach, the court can bring it to 
an end leaving the SFO to proceed with a criminal prosecution.8 Corporations can 
thus avoid the stigma of a criminal conviction and the collateral consequences that 
a prosecution may bring, but are still effectively punished for their crimes.9 Given 
that the use of DPAs reflects a shift towards a more US-style approach, the paper 
examines whether the distinct UK-based DPAs will represent an effective alterna-
tive to corporate criminal enforcement.10 Proceeding in five parts, the paper explores 
whether DPAs would play a constructive role in reshaping the UK and even the 
global anti-bribery landscape. Section 2 starts with an introduction to DPAs in the 
context of tackling global economic crime. The collateral consequences of subject-
ing companies to a criminal prosecution can be devastating, which partly justifies 
5 Crime and Courts Act 2013, s. 45; The Crime and Courts Act 2013 (the Act) received Royal Assent on 
25 April 2013.
6 Crime and Courts Act 2013, Schedule 17.
7 SFO, Deferred Prosecution Agreements Code of Practice Crime and Courts Act 2013 (11 February 
2014), https ://www.cps.gov.uk/publi catio ns/direc tors_guida nce/dpa_cop.pdf (‘SFO, DPA 2014’), § 14.5.
8 UK Ministry of Justice, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: Government Response to the Consultation 
on a New Enforcement Tool to Deal with Economic Crime Committed by Commercial Organisations 
CP(R)18/2012 (23 October 2012), https ://www.gov.uk/gover nment /uploa ds/syste m/uploa ds/attac hment 
_data/file/23600 0/8463.pdf.
9 Alschuler (2009), p 1359.
10 George et al. (2014), p 115.
3 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 15 USC §§ 78m, 78o, 78dd-1 to -3 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011); 
UK Bribery Act 2010; PRC Criminal Law (Amendment 2011), Art. 164; Perkel (2003), p 683.
4 Hasnas (2007), p 1269.
2 Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in Worldwide Brib-
ery (15 December 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press /2008/2008-294.htm; DoJ, Siemens AG and 
Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Mil-
lion in Combined Criminal Fines. Coordinated Enforcement Actions by DOJ, SEC and German Authori-
ties Result in Penalties of $1.6 Billion (15 December 2008), http://www.justi ce.gov/opa/pr/2008/Decem 
ber/08-crm-1105.html; Coffee (1981), p 386.
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the legitimacy of the innovative approach. To a great extent, the deterrent tool’s 
efficiency in combating bribery relies on a credible threat of prosecution. Section 3 
discusses the evolving framework under which the court plays significant but con-
troversial roles in overseeing the DPAs. A crucial question lies in the degree of judi-
cial oversight and the mechanism for achieving the goal. Section 4 looks into chal-
lenges through a case study, demonstrating that the functionally equivalent approach 
results inevitably in divergence in enforcement practices, despite the legal conver-
gence between jurisdictions. This part analyses whether a single global settlement 
via DPAs is viable and considers how to cater for trans-jurisdictional matters and to 
level the international playing field. Some practical impediments stand in the way 
of achieving the desired goal, such as an issue of double jeopardy. Section 5 pro-
poses how an MNC can effectively avoid exposure to multiple jurisdictions through 
enhancing internal governance. It is vital to implement a global anti-bribery com-
pliance programme with particular regard to due diligence. A conclusion is given 
based on the above discussion in Sect. 6.
2  Prosecution’s Collateral Consequences vis‑à‑vis DPAs’ Virtues
Criminal prosecutions are not always an ideal mechanism to pursue wrongdoers,11 
given that collateral consequences are sometimes immense and even harm inno-
cent parties.12 The reputational damage and potential follow-on litigation may cause 
credit downgrades as a result of deteriorating financial health.13 While reshaping 
corporate behaviour, DPAs enable MNCs to avoid such catastrophic effects. Two 
goals can be achieved through incentivising responsible corporate behaviour while 
mitigating adverse collateral effects.14 It is of the utmost significance to pursue a 
legitimate avoidance of the risks arising from organisational indictment and allevi-
ate further uncertainties of trials.15
2.1  Collateral Consequences of Corporate Prosecutions
Prosecutors are increasingly concerned with catastrophic consequences result-
ing from bringing a bribery action to court.16 MNCs may face devastating debar-
ment, the so-called corporate death sentence, or may even collapse.17 The potential 
damage could risk causing unjust harm to innocent parties.18 DPAs are designed to 
mitigate companies’ further loss and protect those who have not been involved in 
11 Arlen and Kraakman (1997), p 687.
12 ‘Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behaviour through Criminal Sanctions Developments in the 
Law’, Harv. Law Rev. 92(6):1227–1375 (1979).
13 Xiao (2013), p 233.
14 Markof (2013), p 797.
15 Crespo (2018), p 1303.
16 Nanda (2011), pp 63–89.
17 Grossman (2016), p 697.
18 Weissman and Newman (2007), p 411.
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the wrongdoing. The enforcement tool enables prosecutors to have an alternative 
tool to tackle bribery and ensure nearly the same punitive effects while avoiding the 
adverse results.19 It is worthy to note that the DPA mandate should not be justified 
merely because of the collateral consequences.20
2.1.1  Debarment: Corporate Death Sentence
Criminal prosecution could result in debarment from public procurement contracts, 
which is also known as a death penalty for a business.21 For instance, the Public 
Procurement Directive (2004/18/EC [2004] OJ L 134/114) of the EU mandates the 
exclusion of suppliers convicted of corruption.22 Meanwhile, the procurement sys-
tem would lose the opportunity to incentivise positive corporate behaviour.23 Debar-
ment will drive corrupt activity further underground and even make it undetectable 
indefinitely,24 since it discourages companies from engaging in voluntary disclosure 
to enforcement authorities.25 Criminal liability considerably weakens the principal’s 
threat to self-report bribery because of such a strong disincentive. Even though a 
DPA disposing of bribery offences does not trigger mandatory exclusion but may 
trigger discretionary exclusion in the UK,26 the chilling effect undermines coun-
terproductively the deterrence. As such, threats by a corporation to take such pre-
ventive action will fail to deter the agent’s future bribery.27 This echoes Arlen and 
Kraakman’s finding that the undesired consequence compromises the deterrence of 
the internal safeguarding measures.28 The EU Public Procurement Directive 2014 
softens the rules on debarment, which may, to some extent, mitigate the debarment 
risk.29 It still remains a dilemma whether to self-disclose unlawful conduct.
2.1.2  (Un)just Harm for an Innocent Party
A guilty plea entails severe collateral consequences for innocent third parties and 
delays prompt the restitution of victims.30 Harm extends beyond an entity in question 
19 Alexander and Cohen (2015), p 537.
20 Arlen and Kahan (2016), p 323.
21 Markof (2013), p 797; Tillipman (2012), p 49.
22 The Directive requires that contractors that are convicted by a final judgement of any of the following 
crimes be debarred from public procurement: (1) participating in a criminal organisation; (2) corruption; 
(3) fraud; or (4) money laundering.
23 Tillipman (2012), p 49.
24 Kaal and Lacine (2013), p 61.
25 Stevenson and Wagoner (2011), p 775.
26 UK Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (SI2015/102); OCG Guidance on the Mandatory Exclusion of 
Economic Operators, 2010.
27 Arlen and Kraakman (1997), p 687.
28 Arlen and Kraakman (1997), p 687.
29 EU Directive 2014/24 on public procurement [2014] OJ L 94/65 was implemented in the UK by the 
Public Contracts Regulations 2015 on 26 February 2015.
30 Arlen and Kraakman (1997), p 687.
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to its shareholders, other stakeholders and even the wider economy.31 Their interests 
may be affected by large fines and an enormous compliance expense, including the 
costly corporate monitorship.32 As Alschuler observed, ‘the embarrassment of cor-
porate criminal liability is that it punishes the innocent along with the guilty’.33 A 
plausible issue arises as to whether shareholders should be viewed as an innocent 
party. They are, in principle, responsible for corporate wrongdoing since they have 
the power to choose corporate management.34 In the arena of corporate governance, 
shareholders normally take financial risks whenever they invest.35 Criminal liability 
is one of the assumed investment risks prior to the purchase of corporate stock.36 
Shareholders will also indirectly benefit virtually from illicit gains, provided that the 
bribery goes undetected.37 Otherwise, they are required merely to surrender unjust 
enrichment, when the corporation is forced to disgorge illicit profits.38 Shareholders 
are not penalised in substance, and collateral risks are thus not adequately justifiable 
for DPAs as opposed to prosecution in this regard.39 Despite the argument surround-
ing shareholders, prosecutors have long recognised the profound collateral conse-
quences, which leads them to act with great deliberation in criminalising corporate 
behaviour.40
2.1.3  Positive and Negative Effect: Weighing the Gains and Losses
Corporations are sensitive to the expected cost of bribery. Whether or not to self-
report remains a complex balancing decision. In October 2016, Walmart purport-
edly rejected a proposal to pay $600 million to settle an FCPA investigation.41 It 
has finally spent $840 million on the investigation into its compliance failures, 
which took enforcement agencies nearly 6 years.42 Apparently, neither the corporate 
defendant nor the prosecutor wins in substance in such a lengthy process. The fre-
quency of prosecution has declined particularly against those high-profile corpora-
tions.43 Although a criminal conviction has a destabilising effect, MNCs should by 
no means rely on the negative effect in an effort to avoid prosecution.44 Any defence 
based on collateral consequences must be subjected to increased scrutiny. The court 
33 Alschuler (2009), p 1359.
34 Alschuler (2009), p 1359.
35 Macey (1991), p 315.
36 Kennedy (1985), p 443.
37 Macey (1991), p 315.
38 SFO, Shareholder Agrees Civil Recovery by SFO in Mabey & Johnson (13 January 2012), http://
www.sfo.gov.uk/press -room/lates t-press -relea ses/press -relea ses-2012/share holde r-agree s-civil -recov ery-
by-sfo-in-mabey --johns on.aspx.
39 Markof (2013), p 797.
40 Kaal and Lacine (2013), p 61; Paulsen (2007), p 1434.
41 Addady (2016).
42 Viswanatha and Nassauer (2017).
43 Garrett (2011), p 1775.
44 Garrett (2016), pp 1–18.
31 McLean (2012), p 1970.
32 Beale (2009), p 1481.
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also balances the equities at issue, weighing the DPA’s costs and benefits.45 In this 
vein, DPAs are valuable alternatives, whose potential settlement appeals simply to 
avoid the cost and uncertainty of a trial.46 It is worth examining whether DPAs are 
appropriate to resolve the allegation in the UK.
2.2  Transplanting DPAs into the UK Enforcement System
As discussed earlier, DPAs not only enable a company to avoid these financial reper-
cussions and a reputational damage disaster scenario, but also have the same puni-
tive and deterrent effect as a guilty plea.47 The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) uses 
DPAs to reach settlements with companies, whereby it agrees to suspend criminal 
proceedings provided that they can meet certain conditions.48 A defendant is typi-
cally required to admit guilt and pay significant fines, restitution and disgorgement 
of fees.49 A decision whether to enter into a DPA will rest with the Director of the 
SFO and the Director of Public Prosecutions.50
2.2.1  The DPAs’ Virtues
DPAs incentivise corporations to establish an effective compliance programme, 
through which they could ultimately shield themselves from criminal liability.51 
As a sword over the entities’ head, DPAs strike a critical balance between penalty 
and deterrence, and minimise collateral consequences.52 Companies and prosecu-
tors are thus allowed to resolve high-stakes claims of bribery through the formers’ 
comprehensive cooperation and enhancement of rigorous compliance measures.53 
The scheme helps to avoid reputational damage, lengthy investigations and uncer-
tain proceedings. A DPA will not trigger mandatory debarment under the EU Public 
Procurement Regime, since it is not a criminal offence.54 The cost-efficient outcome 
through cooperation may justify the use of other routes as opposed to a criminal 
prosecution.55 The enforcement tool not only allays a financial burden, but also 
ensures that innocent parties are not unduly punished for corporate wrongdoing.56 
The use of DPAs can free up precious judicial resources, enabling enforcement 
45 Arlen and Kahan (2016), p 323.
46 Xiao (2013), p 233.
47 O’Sullivan (2014), p 29.
48 SFO, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: New Guidance for Prosecutors (14 February 2014), http://
www.sfo.gov.uk/press -room/lates t-press -relea ses/press -relea ses-2014/defer red-prose cutio n-agree ments 
-new-guida nce-for-prose cutor s.aspx (‘SFO, DPAs New Guidance’).
49 Lewis and Woodward (2014), p 923.
50 SFO, DPA 2014, § 2.1.
51 Werle (2019), p 1366.
52 Greenblum (2005), p 1863.
53 Cunningham (2014), p 1.
54 Arlen (2019).
55 Fisher et al. (2013), p 159.
56 Gilchrist (2012), p 1.
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authorities to investigate a higher proportion of bribery cases.57 By encouraging 
self-disclosure, the increasing detection of unlawful conduct leads to more corporate 
accountability.58 The number of FCPA investigations per year has increased tenfold 
in the US.59 A total of 209 settlements were entered into during 2005–2012 while 
only 21 had been reached during 2000–2004.60 Some high-profile agreements, like 
Siemens AG in 2008, demonstrate the efficacy of DPAs.61 Corporate crime would 
not have been able to be uncovered without this innovative enforcement tool.62 From 
the prosecutors’ perspective, the uncertainties of a trial will be avoided as well, 
given the difficulty in meeting the high standard in establishing criminal liability.
2.2.2  Inevitable Risks Accompanied by DPAs
On the other side of the coin, there could be some unintended consequences with 
the use of DPAs.63 First, there will be a potential risk for shareholders if a company 
agrees to a substantial fine and costly compliance programmes in return for a DPA.64 
Khanna observed that sometimes directors have little incentive to object to corporate 
criminal liability.65 Even in contravention of their fiduciary duty to promote the suc-
cess of company, they may be inclined to prefer significant pecuniary penalties to 
the avoidance of other sanctions, including their own prosecution.66 Judge Kaplan 
held that: ‘DPAs allow companies to avoid prosecution by paying a fine instead of 
forcing culpable individuals to “pay the price” for their criminal offences’.67 Despite 
the seminal doctrine of a separate legal entity, it is individuals who commit crime 
for which a company is always responsible. The lack of individual prosecution cre-
ates a risk of insufficient deterrence and enforcement agencies need to ensure the 
adequacy of prosecution to attenuate the risks.68 Although the US has recently intro-
duced the Ending Too Big to Jail Act to address the problem of executives not being 
held criminally liable for their offences, it remains to be seen whether the Act can 
show its teeth and bring those culpable individuals to accountability.69
57 Uhlmann (2013), p 1295.
58 Wilt (2016), p 61.
59 Weiss (2009), p 471.
60 Kaal and Lacine (2013), p 61.
61 SEC, SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in Worldwide Bribery (15 December 2008), http://
www.sec.gov/news/press /2008/2008-294.htm; SEC, SEC Charges KBR and Halliburton for FCPA Viola-
tions (11 February 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press /2008/2008-294.htm; SEC, SEC Charges Seven 
Oil Services and Freight Forwarding Companies for Widespread Bribery of Customs Officials (4 Novem-
ber 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press /2010/2010-214.htm.
62 Bonneau (2011), p 365.
63 Bourjaily (2015), p 543.
64 Warin and Boutros (2007), p 121.
65 Khanna (1996), p 1477.
66 UK Companies Act (CA 2006) s. 172(1); Lewis and Woodward (2014), p 923.
67 United States v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 18-cr-150 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2018), ECF No. 9.
68 Oded (2017), p 49.
69 The Act was introduced on 14 March 2018 (115th Congress, 2017–2019).
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Second, there is no guarantee that self-reporting will lead to non-prosecution.70 
Neither will there be a guarantee for a DPA since the UK law entails more rigorous 
judicial oversight than its US counterpart.71 The US Department of Justice (DoJ) 
revised the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy that furthers uncertainty.72 Even 
so, this uncertainty should not be overread but interpreted dialectically, given the 
substantial challenges that the SFO faces due to the high threshold for establishing 
corporate criminal liability. As such, neither the DoJ nor the SFO guarantees a DPA 
based on self-reporting itself, which forms only part of the requirements that poten-
tially qualify for the credit. Plausibly, preserving prosecution is essential to ensuring 
the exercise of justice.73 Whether to self-report has wide-reaching implications, and 
a company in question needs to balance the risks and potential benefits on a global 
basis.
Third, an MNC likely exposes itself to being potentially sued in multiple jurisdic-
tions because of its self-incriminating admissions disclosed publicly in a DPA. In 
principle, any DPA must be made public so as to ensure transparency in the UK.74 
Some prosecutors insist that a firm agrees not to dispute the facts and matters con-
tained in the DPA as a prerequisite for the settlement.75 This request departs from 
a policy of ‘Neither Admit Nor Deny’ which is widely adopted by the DoJ and 
SEC.76 A common concern is that documents disclosed to an enforcement author-
ity in which a company admits to bribery could prejudice potential litigation.77 A 
convicted entity may thus be subject to a follow-up civil action.78 This holds par-
ticularly true for those MNCs with a global presence. They could face prosecution 
in other jurisdictions, notably in the US where the doctrine of double jeopardy is 
more limited than in the UK.79 Plaintiffs can make use of the admissions in support 
of their claims, because a statement of facts is not binding in any other legal pro-
ceeding.80 Unless a double-jeopardy scenario is to be avoided, incentives for MNCs’ 
self-disclosure will be considerably compromised. This makes it more difficult for 
70 SFO, Corporate Self-Reporting (October 2012), https ://www.sfo.gov.uk/publi catio ns/guida nce-polic 
y-and-proto cols/corpo rate-self-repor ting/; R v. Skansen Interiors Limited (Southwark Crown Court 
2018).
71 Pollard (2014).
72 DoJ, FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy (November 2017; updated March 2019), https ://www.justi 
ce.gov/crimi nal-fraud /file/83841 6/downl oad.
73 US DoJ (2017). Vorenberg (1981), p 1521.
74 UK Ministry of Justice, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: Government Response to the Consultation 
on a New Enforcement Tool to Deal with Economic Crime Committed by Commercial Organisations 
CP(R)18/2012 (23 October 2012), https ://www.gov.uk/gover nment /uploa ds/syste m/uploa ds/attac hment 
_data/file/23600 0/8463.pdf.
75 Garret (2017), p 1483.
76 Kaul (2015), p 535.
77 Boutros and Funk (2012), p 259.
78 Reilly (2015), p 1683.
79 Principato (2014), p 767.
80 SEC, Deferred Prosecution Agreement with Tenaris (May 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press 
/2011/2011-112-dpa.pdf.
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the entity to nurture a culture to assist regulators in detecting and sanctioning the 
bribery, and even to confess voluntarily to bribery.81
2.3  Enhance Credibility in Forming DPAs: Credible Threats against Both 
Principals and Agents
The DPAs’ ultimate efficacy will be determined by the level of companies’ willing-
ness to engage and prosecutors’ effective use of the enforcement tool.82 The latter 
has immense leverage during the negotiation of a DPA, because a criminal indict-
ment has devastating consequences, including debarment, not to mention a drop in a 
company’s stock price.83 DPAs are unlikely to be an effective tool to combat bribery 
unless there is a creditable threat of prosecution.84 Empty threats without effective 
sanctions carry little weight. Companies will not be deterred by a threat of prosecu-
tion as long as corporate fines remain trivial and the challenges of convicting an 
individual are substantial.85 The system will have to solve the credibility problem in 
order to induce an adequate deterrent regime.86
The law governing corporate enforcement remains generally inefficient, which 
justifies the induction of corporate policing.87 Companies are potential enforcers 
because they can intervene to help enforcement agencies investigate crime and con-
vict individual wrongdoers.88 DPAs help to reduce bribery, but only to the extent that 
a company is able to credibly threaten to undertake certain compliance measures,89 
including sanctions against its rogue employees. The enhanced disciplinary meas-
ures are thereby indispensable to improve internal controls.90 In terms of the efficacy 
of enforcement, it must be ensured that individuals who are tempted to commit brib-
ery expect to be punished. In theory, the resultant credible threat of criminal liability 
spurs corporate efforts to prevent bribery,91 steering those companies in question 
to turn to a DPA. This hypothesis has been well proved in US v. Andersen,92 given 
the consequences of the decision by Arthur Andersen to reject the offer of a DPA in 
2002.93 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed a trial court conviction that had 
81 Security Exchange Commission (SEC) and Department of Justice (DoJ), A Resource Guide to the 
FCPA US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (14 November 2012), https ://www.justi ce.gov/sites /defau lt/files /
crimi nal-fraud /legac y/2015/01/16/guide .pdf, p 30 (FCPA Guidance).
82 Arlen (2016), p 191.
83 Diskant (2008), p 126, Weissmann (2007), p 1319.
84 Arlen (2019).
85 ‘Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behaviour through Criminal Sanctions Developments in the 
Law’, Harv. Law Rev. 92(6):1227–1375 (1979).
86 Arlen and Kraakman (1997), p 687.
87 Arlen and Kahan (2016), p 323.
88 Braithwaite (1982), p 1466.
89 Arlen and Kraakman (1997), p 687.
90 Rose (2015b), Chapter II.
91 ‘Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behaviour through Criminal Sanctions Developments in the 
Law’, Harv. Law Rev. 92(6):1227-1375 (1979).
92 Buell (2011), p 87.
93 Greenblum (2005), p 1863; Weissmann (2007), p 1319.
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been upheld by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however.94 This case does not 
necessarily suggest that the existing DPA system can properly address the issue. Due 
to the high threshold for establishing corporate criminal liability, it remains to be 
seen whether companies will consider DPAs a worthy alternative to the threat of liti-
gation.95 Vigorous enforcement and stringent penalties would help to achieve such 
goals between principals and agents, as well as prosecutors and corporations.96 Insti-
tuting DPAs into the UK not only provides the SFO and DPP with an option to avoid 
adverse results, but also considerably changes the way in which companies evaluate 
their strategic approaches upon the discovery of bribery. It is imperative for MNCs 
to take robust precautions to guard against bribery undertaken on their behalf, and to 
ensure that their anti-bribery programmes are adequately in place.
3  Judicial Supervision of DPAs
DPAs have become a mainstay of the US enforcement authorities’ arsenal. The 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and DoJ have expanded the use of this tool 
within the enforcement architecture and regularly reach a binding settlement.97 Ide-
ally, DPAs should yield a result that is consistent with the goals including deter-
rence, remediation and punishment.98 The UK’s early judicial involvement differs 
substantially from that of the US model. It is worth looking into the US’ experiences 
in terms of the pros and cons concerning judicial oversight and ascertaining whether 
the divergence would affect the DPAs’ viability in the UK.
3.1  The Unsettled Issue of the Judicial Review of DPAs in the US
The insufficient judicial oversight has caused substantial concerns as to the appro-
priateness of DPAs in the US.99 A critical challenge arises, given that the parties’ 
agreement to proceeding with a DPA is entered into outside the court’s purview.100 
The system of DPAs seems to handicap the ability of the judiciary to be substan-
tially involved in the referral process.101 Alleged firms have increasingly entered into 
DPAs and have settled out of court rather than being punitively prosecuted as guilty 
parties in the judicial system.102 A growing number of judges have been increas-
ingly concerned about the issues of transparency and accountability.103 Greenblum 
highlights the difficulties in judicial involvement at the negotiation stage: ‘[…] even 
94 Arthur Andersen LLP v. US, 544 US 696 (2005).
95 SFO, DPA 2014, § 1.1.
96 Anderson and Waggoner (2014).
97 Allen (2014), p 285.
98 Gallo and Greenfield (2014), p 525.
99 Kaal and Lacine (2013), p 61.
100 Weiss (2009), p 471.
101 Warin and Boutros (2007), p 121.
102 Miller (2016), p 135.
103 Golumbic and Lichy (2014), p 1293.
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after a deferral proposal is filed with the court for the judge’s approval, no judge 
would have a substantive basis for altering its proposed terms given the lack of for-
mal adversarial dispute between the parties’.104 The analysis of DPAs in the US 
demonstrates that the process is arbitrary, unpredictable and inconsistent.105 There 
should be greater judicial involvement in the entire DPA process and a firm commit-
ment to transparency.106 As Silverglate said: ‘cases generally are settled rather than 
tried before a judge, thus the government’s view of the statute has been untested in 
the courts’.107 This raises another inquiry as to whether some companies are too big 
to be prosecuted.108 It is alleged that the prolific use of DPAs has created a pros-
ecution-free zone for large banks on the ground that prosecuting large banks has 
the potential to destabilise the economy.109 There is even a perception that power 
is shifting away from the judiciary and into the hands of the DoJ.110 Upon this rea-
soning, DPAs should proceed by a waiver of indictment, confirmed in open court, 
and the filing of criminal information.111 It seems that DPAs have virtually led ‘to a 
deplorable culture of cooperation’.112 These concerns have prompted further consid-
eration of the judiciary’s role in the DPA process in that:
the effect of DPAs has created the ‘New Regulators’ as the DoJ has fashioned 
for itself a new role of ‘focusing more on prospective questions of corporate 
governance and compliance, and less on the retrospective question of the enti-
ty’s criminal liability’.113
Arguably, the DoJ may transgress the bounds of lawfulness so as to warrant judi-
cial intervention to protect the integrity of the court.114 Vega was concerned that 
DPAs may ignore judicial opinion, that is, whether a court would agree with the 
agreement reached between the regulator and a defendant.115 The role of the judge 
appears to rubber-stamp the settlement, without inquiring into the legal basis for the 
DPA including whether it would tailor the offence more accurately.116 It constitutes 
a challenge of deploying a precision instrument to resolve allegations of corporate 
bribery.117
Few statutes lay down with precision the judiciary’s role with regard to DPAs.118 
Steinzor argued that:
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once prosecutors and a corporate defendant put a DPA before the court, they 
have irreversibly injected the court’s supervisory authority into the process, 
effectively conceding that the court may approve or reject the agreement.119
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 requires that felony charges be brought 
against a defendant by a grand jury indictment. The protocol typically necessitates 
some judicial involvement in the DPA process, at least in accepting the waiver of 
indictment.120 A substantive gatekeeper role may be assumed under both Rule 11 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the US Sentencing Guidelines,121 
despite the fact that the latter does not provide clear authority for the court to 
approve or reject DPAs.122 In view of an argument that the agreements should be 
filed in court and be subject to its oversight,123 a commentator remarked that:
the role of the judge is not only a neutral adjudicator defending corporate 
offenders vulnerable to collateral consequences, but also a fiduciary for con-
stituencies otherwise unrepresented in corporate deferral process and poten-
tially vulnerable to negative externalities.124
The parties are under pressure to subject their DPA to the legitimate exercise of 
the court’s authority.125 Consistent with the increased judicial supervision of SEC 
settlements, courts appear to be overseeing decisions to reach DPAs.126 In Novem-
ber 2011, Judge Rakoff rejected a $285 million settlement between the SEC and Cit-
icorp, and held that it was neither reasonable, nor fair, nor adequate, nor in the pub-
lic interest.127 After all, the judiciary has an indispensable role to play in examining 
DPAs to ensure they are in the interests of justice.128 In US v. HSBC, Judge Gleeson 
invoked the federal court’s traditional supervisory authority and held that the court 
should use the supervisory power to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings.129 
This was echoed by Wilt in that: ‘there shall be public scrutiny of the process, the 
public will know what wrongdoing has taken place and the sanctions for it, includ-
ing any penalty that has been paid’.130 It remains to be seen whether the tightened 
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judicial control would override the transparency and accountability concerns that 
have proliferated in the US.131
3.2  More Prominent Judicial Oversight under the DAPs in the UK
The UK Crime and Courts Act 2013 (CCA 2013) received Royal Assent on 23 April 
2013, of which the DPA is addressed in Schedule 17 to assist prosecutors in combat-
ing corporate criminal offences.132 As a part of English law for the first time, CCA 
2013 allows enforcement agencies to employ DPAs to resolve criminal allegations 
against corporations.133 It represents a milestone in antibribery, since courts, leg-
islators and prosecutors have long exhibited scepticism about the extent to which 
the UK should transplant the US-style enforcement tool.134 The Fraud, Bribery 
and Money Laundering Offences Definitive Guideline provided for the first time a 
framework for the sentencing of corporate offenders in the UK.135 The Guideline 
was issued to facilitate the application of DPAs with financial penalties being taken 
into consideration. It is worth examining whether the earlier judicial involvement 
can be well justified in order for DPAs to work effectively in the UK.
MNCs consider the BA 2010 to be the toughest anti-bribery law in the world. 
An entity will be subject to criminal liability if an associated person commits brib-
ery on its behalf,136 whereby the entity has failed to maintain adequate procedures 
in place.137 This approach once again reflects the UK’s conventional jurisprudential 
philosophy that ex ante efforts are given considerable weight, compared with the 
procedural control and ex post resolution. Under BA 2010, prosecutors do not have 
to demonstrate mens rea on the part of the company.138 Potential penalties include 
unlimited fines, and even debarment from public procurement contracts, while indi-
viduals could face up to 10 years imprisonment.139 Differing from their US coun-
terparts, UK prosecutors must seek judicial approval to commence initial negotia-
tions.140 A settlement would not be entered into, were it not in the public interest.141 
The public-interest test simply requires the prosecutor to ensure that the public inter-
est would not be abused by a DPA in lieu of prosecution.142 The rationale is based 
on whether DPAs are in the interest of justice and whether the proposed terms are 
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fair, reasonable and proportionate to the offence.143 The judicial authorities make 
their decisions upon a rigorous evaluation.144 This implies that the self-disclosure of 
bribery will no longer predispose the SFO to civil remedies.145 According to Lord 
Justice Thomas:
it would be inconsistent with basic principles of justice for the criminality of 
corporations to be glossed over by a civil as opposed to a criminal sanction.146
In formalising a DPA, a preliminary private hearing is required to be held before 
a judge.147 The final hearing will be held in open court and the final agreement will 
be published.148 If the judge plays the role of the fiduciary, he/she should ensure that 
the use of DPAs is not to be abused.149
3.3  DPAs: A Comparative Perspective
The court plays a more prominent supervisory role under the UK DPA regime than 
in the US equivalent.150 There is substantive involvement by the judiciary at an ini-
tial stage, while the judiciary in the US plays a limited role upon the final draft of 
DPAs. There seems to be a clear divergence between the judicial attitudes towards 
DPAs. In scope, the US DoJ has substantial latitude in the types of crimes that DPAs 
may resolve, whereas Schedule 17 limits UK DPAs to mostly economic crimes.151 
The DPA law allows the UK judiciary to play its role at an earlier stage while its US 
counterparts tend to become involved relatively later in the proceedings and on an 
ad hoc basis. In view of procedural control, the UK statutory regime and DPA Code 
set forth a more formalised process and provide a clearer roadmap for implemen-
tation.152 The DoJ has discretion to determine whether there is a breach of DPAs, 
while the Crown Court assumes this role under Schedule 17 with such determina-
tions to be made on the basis of a balance of probabilities.153 The SFO encourages 
compliance, which is labelled as a twofold enforcement approach.154 This is con-
sistent with the UK’s long-standing focus on ex ante internal governance through 
fostering ethical corporate behaviour. In the US, sophisticated court and litigation 
systems are primarily relied upon, which is in line with its long-standing ex post 
143 Crime and Courts Act 2013, Schedule 17, §§ 7(1)–(6).
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resolution. Furthermore, vicarious liability sets the threshold for prosecuting corpo-
rations at a lower level than in the UK.155 Corporations in the US are more inclined 
to cooperate with enforcement authorities so as to avoid potential prosecution.156 As 
such, it is not appropriate for DPAs, at least in their current form, to be simply trans-
planted into the UK judicial system.157
4  Level the International Playing Field: Is a Single Global Settlement 
Viable?
MNCs face an increasing risk of multiple sanctions across jurisdictions arising from 
the same conduct,158 which makes it enormously challenging for them to reach a 
global settlement.159 The companies in question may find that they can no longer 
rely on the defence of ‘neither admit nor deny’ for reduced penalties.160 The case 
of Siemens serves as a typical example whereby it has suffered significant financial 
and reputational damage from prosecutions in both Germany and the US.161 Ideally, 
MNCs would be in a better position to resolve their issues through a single global 
settlement with all relevant regulators.162 The adoption of DPAs makes it feasible 
for the SFO to discuss global resolutions with its foreign counterparts. In principle, 
defendants can seek to enter into joint settlements with both the UK and the US 
authorities, a model which helps to create a roadmap for a global settlement.163
4.1  Cross‑Jurisdictional Settlements
If a global settlement through DPAs could be agreed upon this would potentially be 
conducive to facilitating negotiations between jurisdictions. MNCs are likely subject 
to multiple anti-bribery sanctions that are sometimes inconsistent.164 For instance, 
an ultimate resolution of a case will have to be approved by both the US and UK 
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judicial and enforcement agencies. As discussed earlier, the SFO will not be able to 
participate in global settlements unless there is a DPA approved by the court.165
4.1.1  R v. Innospec
In 2010, the UK and the US pursued criminal cases against Innospec Inc., a Dela-
ware company, and its British subsidiary, Innospec Ltd.166 The SFO’s case was 
developed resulting from a referral by the DoJ to the SFO, and both settlements were 
entered into on the same day.167 The DoJ prosecuted Innospec Inc. for bribery taking 
place in Iraq, so did the SFO relating to Indonesia.168 The DoJ entered into a DPA 
with Innospec and the SFO attempted to enter a plea agreement to settle charges for 
the company’s overseas bribery.169 The enforcement authorities and Innospec nego-
tiated a global settlement designed to penalise Innospec, but meanwhile attempted 
to prevent its insolvency.170 Innospec represented that it could only afford to pay 
$40.2 million, and finally $14.1 million was paid to the DoJ, $11.2 million to the 
SEC, and $2.2 million to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).171 In addi-
tion, it agreed to pay the SFO $12.7 million, of which $6 million was paid as a civil 
penalty.172 The legal basis of the settlement between Innospec and the SFO has been 
challenged.173 Lord Justice Thomas nearly rejected the settlement due to a lack of 
judicial oversight concerning its terms, but then held that:
[i]t will rarely be appropriate for criminal conduct by a company to be dealt 
with any means of a civil recovery order […] agreements to set a criminal pen-
alty prior to a court hearing were not permissible under the laws.174
In the furtherance of his position, he continued that the court has a duty to ‘rigor-
ously scrutinise in open court in the interests of transparency and good governance 
based on a plea to see whether it reflects the public interest’.175
The case of Innospec highlights the difficulties arising from different opinions 
between the SFO as the ‘regulator’ and the courts as the ‘judicature’.176 The SFO’s 
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approach of fostering self-disclosure faces considerable challenges.177 There is lit-
tle incentive to self-report bribery due largely to the high risk that the court may 
not accept a settlement agreed with the SFO. If the judiciary did not agree to the 
proposed arrangement with the SFO,178 the alleged entity could place itself in a 
rather disadvantageous position because of an admission of guilt.179 It is the first 
case where a global settlement has been sought in respect of concurrent criminal 
proceedings by the two primary jurisdictions.180 The fact that the conduct encom-
passed in each arrangement differed from the other undermines deeper collabora-
tion between the two enforcement authorities. The resolution also paves the way for 
exploring how to coordinate the application of the double jeopardy doctrine, which 
will be examined in the following part. Thomas LJ’s Sentencing Remarks reflect the 
divergences between the two jurisdictions.181 This indicates that the judiciary in the 
US is more inclined to accept such pleas than its UK counterpart. Innospec demon-
strates differing ways in which it has linked courts in separate jurisdictions.182 The 
judicial roles in global settlements need to be refined in order for DPAs to be more 
viable.183 It remains uncertain how global settlements could be achieved given that 
a DPA in the UK does not offer a guarantee against prosecution in another jurisdic-
tion.184 There clearly needs to be a stronger international consensus in this regard.185
4.1.2  ICBC Standard Bank plc
Despite the challenges, the MNCs in question are expected to cooperate with the 
SFO at an early stage. Under the terms of the DPA, the charges against ICBC Stand-
ard were suspended for 3 years. The terms of the DPA were ratified at a public hear-
ing on 30 November 2015 before Lord Justice Leveson, under which ICBC Standard 
agreed to pay US$32 million.186 On the same day, the SEC imposed a penalty of 
US$4.2 million on the bank in a separate DPA.187
The bank’s extensive cooperation was credited with having led the SFO and the 
court to approve the DPA, including the prompt self-disclosure of its own internal 
investigation.188 This is the first case in which the SFO has showed its teeth against 
an entity for violating Section 7 under BA 2010.189 In terms of internal governance, 
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the use of DPAs incentivises ethical conduct, and bona fide cooperation will likely 
convince an enforcement authority to address the offence in lieu of a criminal pros-
ecution.190 Given the extraterritorial nature of BA 2010, the case has a far-reaching 
impact on companies which face exposure to liability for bribery by their associated 
persons extraterritorially.191
4.1.3  GSK & Rolls‑Royce
DPAs are designed to be a tool that seeks to achieve the goals whilst being transpar-
ent, clear and consistent.192 GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) paid the US SEC $20 million 
to settle FCPA violations without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings on 30 
September 2016.193 In January 2017, Rolls-Royce paid £497.25 million and entered 
into a DPA with the SFO to settle allegations of wrongdoing.194 The SFO dropped 
investigations into Rolls-Royce and GSK on 22 February 2019,195 which has given 
rise to criticism as to whether the interests of justice have been served. The SFO’s 
decision casts doubts about the viability of DPAs and the effectiveness of its inves-
tigatory powers. It raises a pertinent question about the purpose of DPAs, which 
undermines considerably the credible threats against both those powerful MNCs and 
their top executives. Given the SFO’s low prosecution rate, MNCs’ incentive to self-
report will be compromised.196 The SFO’s dropping of its investigations potentially 
has significant implications for how those powerful MNCs’ crimes will be prose-
cuted in the UK, which may also trigger criticisms over the integrity of the DPA 
process. One has legitimate concerns as to whether the phenomenon of ‘too big to 
prosecute’ exists in the UK’s anti-bribery campaign.
4.2  The Doctrine of Double Jeopardy and Deferred Prosecution Agreements
The DPA, in theory, is likely to result in follow-on investigations by other regula-
tors as well as civil lawsuits by some involved stakeholders.197 Bribery allegations 
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often trigger concurrent proceedings in multiple jurisdictions based upon one sin-
gle occurrence, which could cause a potential clash between DPAs and the risk 
of double jeopardy.198 One argument is that the integrity of the judicial system 
could be furthered through duplicative punishments.199 In both theory and the real 
world, there is little solid evidence to support this approach. It remains unclear as 
to whether multiple penalties serve the interests of justice. On the contrary, there 
have been comprehensive studies exploring how to proportionately and harmoni-
ously address duplicative and multiple prosecutions of the same unlawful conduct. 
The prohibition of double jeopardy bars repeated prosecutions for the same con-
duct that originates from the doctrine of res judicata.200 With regard to cross-border 
bribery prosecutions, it remains a conundrum to protect the entity’s right not to be 
tried twice for the same offence.201 The risk of facing multiple prosecutions creates 
a disincentive for companies to self-disclose potential bribery to enforcement agen-
cies.202 In this vein, the expansion of corporate offences has increased the theoretical 
complexity of applying the double jeopardy protection.203
A French court has applied the doctrine of double jeopardy in attempting to 
address the interaction of DPAs between jurisdictions.204 The case concerned an 
allegation of bribery relating to the United Nation’s Iraqi Oil for Food programme 
(OFF).205 On 18 June 2015, a criminal court in Paris acquitted 14 companies on 
charges of active bribery in the same context.206 Four French companies had entered 
into DPAs with the US Department of Justice (DoJ), under which the entities admit-
ted to making ‘kickback’ payments to the Iraqi state when dealing with the OFF.207 
Initially, the French enforcement authorities proposed to prosecute them on the basis 
of the same conduct. Afterwards, the Paris Criminal Court relied on the doctrine 
of double jeopardy enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR).208 The Court then ruled that the DPAs entered into with the US 
authorities relating to the same offence barred a criminal conviction in France on 
the basis of the ne bis in idem principle.209 Procedurally, this decision broadens the 
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200 US CONST. amend. V. ‘[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb’.
201 Davis (2016), p 57.
202 Bhojwani (2012), p 66.
203 ‘Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behaviour through Criminal Sanctions Developments in the 
Law’, Harv. Law Rev. 92(6):1227–1375 (1979).
204 Davis (2016), p 57.
205 ‘The United Nations Oil-for-food Program: Issues of Accountability and Transparency: Hearing 
before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives’  (108th Congress,  2nd Ses-
sion, 28 April 2004).
206 Tokar (2015).
207 Otterman (2005).
208 ICCPR Art. 14(7): ‘[N]o one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he 
has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each 
country.’
209 Boutros and Funk (2012), p 259.
 Q. Bu 
123
scope of the rule against double jeopardy, given that a DPA is not a judgment con-
cluding a trial hearing, but rather an agreement between enforcement authorities and 
the entities in question.210 Similarly, the UK SFO and the US DoJ have actively col-
laborated on global settlements with MNCs. In April 2011, DePuy entered into a 
global settlement agreement which included a DPA with the DoJ and a civil recov-
ery order with the SFO.211 The company had pleaded guilty to bribery offences in 
the US, which virtually deprived the SFO of its legal basis on which the agency 
could rely in order to prosecute the same misconduct. Applying the principle of dou-
ble jeopardy, a prosecution in the UK was withdrawn.212 The rationale for this lies in 
the fact that a DPA has the same legal character as a formally-concluded prosecution 
and the SFO’s investigation was based on the same facts.213 The doctrine of double 
jeopardy in the US is more limited than that in the UK,214 that is, it would not pre-
clude a US prosecution had a DPA been obtained in the UK.215 In practice, however, 
it is likely that the SFO and DoJ are allowed to enter into separate DPAs based on 
distinct facts, with each settlement concentrating on a different jurisdiction.216
4.3  Global Collaboration
Every relevant jurisdiction ought to avoid a disproportionate enforcement of laws by 
multiple enforcement agencies in accordance with the principle of equity.217 Oth-
erwise, MNCs would be deprived of certainties concerning their proceedings and 
likely be left with inconsistences. Although the OECD Convention requests the sig-
natory nations to coordinate concurrent proceedings,218 the non-legally binding pro-
vision renders an enormous gap during its implementation. One of the substantial 
challenges is that some sovereign states do not recognise the double jeopardy doc-
trine for cross-jurisdictional settlements. Some jurisdictions afford no double jeop-
ardy protection regardless of whether a defendant has already been prosecuted by a 
foreign state.219 A failure to achieve in-depth coordination will inevitably result in 
breaching the double jeopardy doctrine. As such, anti-bribery enforcement authori-
ties should arguably seek to collaborate more effectively in cross-border cases. 
Nevertheless, there is no viable answer to an inquiry about how an MNC can be 
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protected from prosecution by multiple jurisdictions.220 It is imperative that the 
challenge is dealt with at an international level where efficient coordination can be 
ensured and the asymmetry of information can be mitigated.221 The government 
should coordinate with foreign jurisdictions seeking to resolve a case where an 
MNC faces duplicative or even multiple investigations for the same offence.222
A multinational entering into a DPA in the context of a cross-border investigation 
expects a coordinated global settlement within a reasonably short period.223 Thus, 
the firm will benefit from minimising negative publicity and a potential adverse 
impact on its stock price.224 Preventing undue double jeopardy would therefore more 
likely result in efficient resolution and consistency.
5  The Role of Corporate Compliance Programmes under DPAs
DPAs have the potential for companies to improve their compliance programmes, 
which also enables the parties involved to avoid the uncertainties that come with 
lengthy investigations.225 An effective compliance programme is a cornerstone in 
a modern governance and legal framework. DPAs enhance a system of incentives 
through encouraging companies to cooperate with enforcement agencies externally 
and to improve compliance mechanisms internally.226 As a requisite condition for 
DPAs, internal compliance must be based on a rigorous assessment of information, 
rather than being influenced by conflicts of interest.227 Notably, enforcement author-
ities often use imposed independent monitors to improve compliance quality, which 
helps to attenuate unintended dire consequences.228
5.1  Two Tales of Compliance Programmes
It is argued that DPAs can entail more efficacy and potentially facilitate compliance 
to tackle bribery.229 Given the tool’s flexible use on an ad hoc basis, MNCs benefit 
greatly from an effective compliance programme.230 They receive credit in DPAs for 
220 Adler (2014), p 448; Matthew (2013).
221 Horder and Alldridge (2013), pp 219–225.
222 US DoJ (2018).
223 Holtmeier (2015), p 493.
224 UK Ministry of Justice (MoJ), A New Enforcement Tool to Deal with Economic Crime by Commer-
cial Organisations: Deferred Prosecution Agreements (10 July 2012), https ://consu lt.justi ce.gov.uk/digit 
al-commu nicat ions/defer red-prose cutio n-agree ments /suppo rting _docum ents/defer redpr osecu tiona greem 
entsi a.pdf.
225 Deming (2011), p 79.
226 Kaal and Lacine (2013), p 61.
227 SFO, DPA 2014.
228 Markof (2013), p 797.
229 Koehler (2010), p 907.
230 Stucke (2014), p 769.
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their ethical behaviour and internal control.231 The enforcement policy is to reward 
the entities for self-disclosure and genuine cooperation during the enforcement 
agencies’ investigation.232 As the FCPA Guide articulates, the DoJ and the SEC con-
sider the merits of a company’s FCPA compliance programme when determining 
whether a DPA should be reached.233 Robust compliance measures can help to pre-
vent serious offences from arising ex ante and mitigate the damage in the case of 
occurrence ex post.234
Tough as it is, putting adequate procedures in place constitutes an affirmative 
defence under BA 2010.235 In turn, the preventive measures alleviate the heavy 
financial burden placed on the SFO to undertake costly investigations. As Alderman 
said, the SFO’s role seems to be shifting from a prosecutor to a regulator as it has 
developed a twofold approach to enforcement.236 Companies can receive reasonable 
credit for self-disclosure. In the case of Mabey and Johnson Ltd,237 the UK courts 
reached an American-style plea bargaining settlement, which demonstrates that the 
variable, such as self-reporting, compliance-building and the use of monitors can 
be rooted in a UK framework as well.238 These factors squarely characterise the key 
features of a DPA, and some approaches mirror the US Sentencing Guidelines’ defi-
nition of an effective compliance programme.239 Koehler provided further insights 
that: ‘the compliance undertakings required pursuant to a DPA are virtually identi-
cal in every enforcement action and have evolved into a compliance template’.240 It 
is noteworthy that a corporate compliance policy which satisfies the FCPA may not 
necessarily be sufficient for those criteria under Section 7 of BA 2010.241 In arguing 
whether DPAs can genuinely improve internal governance, Krawiec was concerned 
that:
the prosecutorial focus on governance will simply lead corporations to adopt 
best practices in name only, akin to how companies go through the motions of 
compliance without promoting legal obedience in fact.242
231 Hamann (2019), p 851.
232 FCPA Guidance, pp 55-60.
233 FCPA Guidance, p 56.
234 Paine (1994); Koehler (2012), p 609.
235 BA 2010, s. 7(2).
236 Richard Alderman (SFO Director), Speech (23 June 2010).
237 R v. Mabey and Johnson Ltd (Crown Court at Southwark, 2009).
238 Regina v. Mabey and Johnson Ltd., No. T2009 7513 [2009] Southwark Crown Court; Serious Fraud 
Office, Mabey & Johnson Ltd Sentencing (25 September 2009), http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press -room/lates 
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As such, a strong framework needs to be built for further guidance on compli-
ance.243 In exercising their discretion, enforcement authorities normally consider 
such factors as the nature of the offence, voluntary disclosure, a compliance pro-
gramme and its effectiveness as well as remedial efforts.244 The DPA’s Code of Prac-
tice underscores the need for effective internal compliance as the most crucial part 
during the negotiation of a settlement.245 A more sophisticated governance regime is 
expected along with efficient oversight by the monitor as well.246
DPAs often involve appointing an independent monitor within an entity.247 As an 
oversight mechanism, the device of monitorship has a theoretical appeal to assure 
compliance with the agreed terms and conditions of DPAs.248 Garrett sees this as 
useful as part of a package to underpin the DPA regime:
the overall approach requires comprehensive compliance programmes, includ-
ing independent monitors, detailed injunctive changes of policy and practice, 
training programs, auditing, data collection and cooperation with the DoJ.249
The objective to make use of monitors does not merely ensure that the law will 
not be violated, but it enhances internal compliance ex ante for the sake of preven-
tion.250 Otherwise, violations could go undetected.251 Prosecutors regard monitor-
ships as an integratory element in ensuring the efficacy of DPAs.252
However, the problem lies in how to realistically ensure the monitor’s independ-
ence from the entity in which it has been embedded, possibly for many years, while 
still maintaining an objective approach as far as the enforcement authorities are 
concerned.253
5.2  Foster a Compliance Culture
There is a culture of compliance being bred with the use of DPAs.254 Presumed as 
a preliminary step to judicial proceedings, a strong internal governance regime is 
helpful to deal with the liability issue on an ad hoc basis.255 A well-designed DPA 
has the potential to entail a positive change in compliance culture by promoting 
companies to address bribery proactively.256 As Breuer said:
243 Morgan (2015).
244 SFO, DPA 2014.
245 FCPA Guidance, pp 56-67.
246 SFO, DPA 2014, §§ 7.11 & 7.22.
247 SFO, DPAs New Guidance.
248 Khanna and Dickinson (2007), p 1713.
249 Garrett (2007), p 853.
250 Ford and Hess (2009), p 679.
251 Cunningham (2014), p 1.
252 Barkow and Barkow (2011), pp 226–248.
253 Deming (2014), p 241; Nelson (2014), p 723.
254 Spivack and Raman (2008), p 150.
255 Gruner (2007), pp 279–306.
256 Griffin (2011), p 110.
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DPAs have had a truly transformative effect […] on corporate culture across 
the globe […] [resulting in] unequivocally far greater accountability for corpo-
rate wrongdoing—and a sea change in corporate compliance efforts.257
In order to achieve this strategy, it is imperative for an MNC to have sophisti-
cated compliance measures in place. In view of procedural control, it is similarly 
significant to introduce a periodical evaluation of the implementation. If necessary, 
some back-up schemes and associated adjustment alternatives should be established 
in advance. The DPA regime can be fine-tuned to achieve future deterrence goals 
through rewarding cooperation and attenuating damages.258 Companies are encour-
aged to engage in improving ethical behaviour as a routine. It is equally essential 
that companies should be incentivised to self-report potential violations, to provide 
feasible remedial measures and to undertake adequate governance in order to pre-
vent repeated bribery.
6  Conclusion
DPAs have been designed to allow prosecutors and the courts to address bribery 
more effectively. This enforcement tool is regularly used to mitigate collateral con-
sequences while promoting accountability, deterrence and remediation. Moreover, 
DPAs serve as a sensible valve in response to an aggressive prosecutorial regime 
and to save precious judicial resources.
Embodying flexibility and pragmatism into law, DPAs potentially incentivise 
companies to self-report wrongful conduct and cooperate bona fide with enforce-
ment authorities. The mechanism transplanted into the UK, in principle, enables 
companies to engage with the SFO at an early stage to achieve a better settlement. 
More significantly, those companies in question should take proactive steps to reme-
diate the concern, to address deeply-rooted causes and to avoid potential repeated 
behaviour. Through this alternative tool to prosecution, the SFO integrates itself 
more effectively into the global campaign against corruption. Uncertainty remains, 
however, about the extent to which the DPA system will change the enforcement 
landscape. Given that the SFO does not ultimately control the outcome of a DPA 
negotiation, the resulting uncertainty makes it a paramount challenge for MNCs to 
enter into global settlements. It takes time to see whether the UK version of DPAs 
will likewise prove effective in tackling bribery. In view of the SFO’s recent con-
tentious conclusion of the investigations in the cases of GSK and Rolls-Royce, the 
viability of DPAs has been cast further into doubt. It is too early to say whether 
DPAs will alter fundamentally the future landscape of the enforcement regime for 
antibribery and whose impact will be viable but only incrementally.
257 Lanny Breuer, Speech at the New York City Bar Association (13 September 2012), http://www.justi 
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